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PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION AND THE 
REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY: LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTS, LEGAL FICTIONS, AND THE RULE 
OF LAW
MIKE ADCOCK AND DERYCK BEYLEVELD*
Durham University
ABSTRACT
Blackstone and Bentham held opposing views about the legitimacy of legal fictions. 
Blackstone felt that legal fictions could be useful devices, whereas Bentham held them 
in complete contempt. This paper aims to partially reconcile these two positions. It 
distinguishes between two types of fictions in the law, one described as a fiction for 
the purposes of the law and the other as a fiction about the law. Examples are drawn 
from medical and patent law to highlight situations where the law has been used in 
a purposive manner to achieve fundamental values, compared to where the law has 
been distorted to realise an aim incompatible with the rule of law. Some implications 
for the standard doctrine of legal fictions are drawn.
Introduction
In the Pro-Life Alliance case,1 the House of Lords resorted to 
purposive construction to bring the use and storage of human embryos 
produced by somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) (the so-called ‘Dolly 
the sheep technique’) under the remit of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act). Although their Lordships agreed 
that SCNT was not an act of fertilisation, we will argue that it is 
a logical implication of the purposive reasoning underlying this 
construction that SCNT is to be regarded as a process of fertilisation 
and enucleated eggs and somatic nuclei used in such a process are 
to be regarded as gametes. But, it might be retorted, ‘SCNT is not 
a process of fertilisation and enucleated eggs and somatic nuclei are 
not gametes! Such a move involves a “legal fiction”’. However, what 
we make of this depends on our attitude towards legal fictions. So, 
for example, William Blackstone held that legal fictions are useful 
devices that enable courts to overcome obstacles to achieving justice,2 
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while Jeremy Bentham had nothing but contempt for them. For him, 
every legal fiction ‘affords presumptive and conclusive evidence of 
moral turpitude in those by whom it was invented and employed’3 
and is of no more use to justice than ‘swindling is to trade’.4
But are all ‘fictions’ deployed in the law alike? Our principal 
aim in this paper is to draw attention to an important difference 
between two ways in which a fictional element can be introduced 
into what might loosely be termed ‘a legal fiction’, which might at 
least partially reconcile the positions of Blackstone and Bentham. This 
distinction is between cases where the fiction that the law employs is 
a fiction from the perspective of science, or common understanding, 
but is a construction necessary to achieve fundamental legal values, 
and cases where the fiction is a fiction about the very thing that the 
law purports to value.
In the first part of this paper, we will elucidate this distinction by 
contrasting the ‘fiction’ we impute in the Pro-Life Alliance case with 
that involved in s.6 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (HTA) (according 
to which, under conditions specified by regulations, persons unable 
to consent to use of storage of their tissue are to be deemed to have 
consented to it). We will argue that the former is a fiction for the 
purposes of the law and fits Blackstone’s characterisation, while the 
latter is a fiction about the law which merits Bentham’s vituperative 
comments. We will maintain, further, that the idea that SCNT is a 
process of fertilisation is not legally speaking a fiction at all, but a 
fact in English law (though it is, indeed, a fiction from the point of 
view of science or common understanding), whereas deemed consent 
in the absence of the ability to consent is a genuine legal fiction 
as it involves distortion of the values that consent has in the law. 
Our general thesis will be that legal facts are to be determined by 
legal purposes. However, we will argue further that it is necessary 
to distinguish contingent from essential legal purposes, and only 
distortions of essential legal purposes (which we will divide into two 
kinds, procedural and substantive) are necessarily inimical to respect 
for the rule of law and justify Bentham’s antagonism. We argue that 
the HTA fiction falls into this category.
In the second part of this paper, we will attempt to apply our 
analysis to a number of cases in patent law: viz. treating (1) the 
process of revealing a genetic sequence that occurs in nature as 
inventive (necessary for patents to be granted) and not merely as a 
process of discovery; (2) whole genera of animals as patentable when 
animal varieties are not patentable under Article 53(b) of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC), and (3) fungi and cells as microbiological 
entities, thereby enabling an exemption from the provision of Article 
53(b) EPC that patents may not be granted to essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals. 
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We will conclude by drawing some implications for the standard 
doctrine of legal fictions.
PART ONE
The Pro-Life Alliance Case5
The HFE Act defines an ‘embryo’ as ‘a live human embryo 
where fertilisation is complete’6 including ‘an egg in the process of 
fertilisation’.7 This raises the question whether an embryo created 
by SCNT (where the nucleus of a somatic cell is inserted into an 
enucleated ovum) is an embryo under the Act. If it is, then use or 
storage of an embryo created by SCNT is regulated by the Act (under 
which it is made subject to a licence being granted by the Human 
Fertilisation Authority (HFEA)), otherwise use and storage of such 
embryos is unregulated by the Act.
This issue was the subject of a judicial review action taken by 
Bruno Quintavalle on behalf of the Pro-Life Alliance. At first instance, 
Crane J held that SCNT does not produce an embryo, because it does 
not involve an act of fertilisation.8 The Court of Appeal reversed this 
decision by implying a phrase into the relevant sub-section, which is 
to be read as defining an embryo as ‘a live human embryo where [if 
it is produced by fertilisation] fertilisation is complete’.9 The House 
of Lords agreed that SCNT is not an act of fertilisation10 but held that 
the HFE Act must be interpreted purposively in the light of subsequent 
developments. This purpose was to regulate human embryos created 
outside the body, rather than only embryos created by fertilisation. 
How, then, is s.1(1) to be read? According to Lord Bingham (with 
whose speech Lord Hoffman and Lord Scott agreed),
the four words [‘where fertilisation is complete’] were not intended to 
form an integral part of the definition of embryo but were directed to 
the time at which it should be treated as such. … The essential thrust 
of section 1(1)(a) was directed to such embryos, not to the manner of 
their creation …11
Lord Steyn was prepared to accept the Court of Appeal’s 
attempt to read the words ‘if produced by fertilisation’ into s.1(1)(a), 
but preferred to treat the restrictive wording of s.1(1) ‘as merely 
illustrative of the legislative purpose’.12 Lord Millet held that the 
words of s.1(1) were not intended to define ‘the word ‘embryo’ but 
to rather limit it to an embryo which is (i) live and (ii) human’.13
In line with this, s.1(1)(a) effectively means that the HFE Act 
applies to any entity that is functionally a human embryo (one that 
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could be implanted into a woman and develop into a human child). 
Such reasoning receives its justification from the Warnock Report, 
which provided the impetus for the HFE Act, which makes it clear 
that the Act was designed to protect ‘the embryo of the human species’ 
because it has ‘a special status’ albeit less than that of a living child 
or adult14 on the grounds that it has the potential to develop into a 
living child or adult.
Suppose, however, that their Lordships had accepted s.1(1) as a 
definition of an embryo. Would this mean that they would have had 
to hold that SCNT embryos were not regulated by the HFE Act? Only 
if (as they did) they agreed with Crane J that SCNT is not a process 
of fertilisation. But why should this be accepted? If the purpose of 
the Act is to protect functional embryos by whatever means they are 
created (which their Lordships’ reasoning relies upon), and, at the 
same time, embryos are defined as created by a process of fertilisation, 
then whatever process creates a functional embryo is, relative to this 
purpose and in the context of this understanding, to be regarded as 
a process of fertilisation. Of course, from a scientific perspective, 
or from the perspective of common understanding or usage, SCNT 
might very well not be a process of fertilisation. But why should the 
law define things according to scientific understanding or purposes 
that are not essential legal? The reason why science would wish to 
distinguish the process of fertilisation as commonly understood from 
SCNT is that it is interested in understanding biological processes and 
functions, and for these purposes needs to understand these in terms 
of their biological differences. That SCNT is a different biological 
process from the union of sperm and ovum is what matters. However, 
for the purposes of the HFE Act, such differences are not material. 
They only matter if they do not produce a functional embryo. The 
idea that SCNT is a process of fertilisation is fictional only relative 
to a definition for scientific purposes. Relative to the law’s purpose 
of protecting functional embryos howsoever created, the creation of 
an embryo by SCNT is a process of fertilisation when embryos are 
defined as produced by fertilisation. Indeed, relative to this purpose, 
it is a legal fact (not a legal fiction at all) that SCNT is a process of 
fertilisation, even if it is a scientific fiction.15 In short, the idea that 
SCNT is a process of fertilisation is only a scientific fiction for the 
law’s purposes but not therefore a legal fiction, unless it is essential 
to the law’s purpose that scientific purposes be achieved thereby. But 
such a proviso does not apply here.
This line of reasoning, we submit, does no violence to the HFE 
Act and the principle of fidelity to Parliament’s intentions. It neither 
requires us to read words into s.1(1), nor does it require us to treat 
this provision as not providing a definition, when it is natural to 
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regard it as such. In addition, it avoids various lacunae or gaps in the 
Act that are left by not regarding SCNT as a process of fertilisation 
(and, correlatively the enucleated ovum and the somatic nucleus as 
gametes in the context of the process of SCNT). For example, the 
Act requires the written consent of gamete providers for the creation 
and use of an embryo,16 but, unless SCNT is regarded as a process of 
fertilisation (and the somatic nucleus and enucleated ovum regarded 
as gametes), this provision will not apply. Also, the Act sets a 
time-limit for keeping or using embryos, set by s.3(3)(a) as at ‘the 
appearance of the primitive streak’, with s.3(4) providing that ‘the 
primitive streak is to be taken to have appeared in an embryo not 
later than the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the day 
when the gametes are mixed’. The appeal courts’ reasoning renders 
this section inapplicable as no gametes are mixed, so the Act sets no 
limits on the time for which an embryo produced using the Dolly 
technique can be kept or used. However, under our imputation, the 
14 days begins when the cloned embryo is created, as it is then that 
what are functionally gametes are mixed.17
Section 6, HTA 2004
According to s.1(1)(d) and (f) of the HTA 2004, storage for 
use for a purpose specified in Part 1 of Schedule 1 (which includes 
transplantation) of any relevant material which has come from a 
human body, and use for such a purpose, are lawful if done with 
‘appropriate consent.’ Where the person is an adult and alive, 
‘appropriate consent’ means the consent of the adult.18
Now, according to s.5(1), performance of an activity to which 
s1(1) applies constitutes an offence unless done with a reasonable 
belief that consent has been given or that s1(1) does not apply to 
the activity. So, appropriate consent is, subject to this proviso, both 
necessary and sufficient for the lawfulness of activities to which 
s.1(1)(d) and (f) apply. This statement might appear to be contradicted 
by s.7, which is headed ‘Powers to dispense with the need for consent’. 
However, s.7(3) and (4) makes it clear that under the conditions laid 
down by s.7, consent is to be deemed to be given. As such, s.7 does 
not create exemptions from the consent requirements of s.1 and s.5, 
but merely specifies that these requirements will be satisfied when 
consent has not actually been given. In other words, s.7 provides that 
the requirements for consent under the Act will be satisfied in certain 
circumstances where consent has not been given.
To like effect, according to s.6
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(a) an activity of a kind mentioned in section 1(1)(d) or (f) involves 
material from the body of a person who
(i) is an adult, and
(ii) lacks capacity to consent to the activity, and
(b) neither a decision of his to consent to the activity, nor a decision 
of his not to consent to it, is in force, there shall for the purposes 
of this Part be deemed to be consent of his to the activity if it is 
done in circumstances of a kind specified by regulations made by 
the Secretary of State.
With reference to this provision, Regulation 3(2)(a) of the 
Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent 
and Transplants) Regulations 2006 specifies that an adult who lacks 
capacity to consent to activities falling under s.1(1)(d) and (f) of the 
Act is deemed to have consented to these activities if they are carried 
out by a person who is acting in what he reasonably believes to be 
the incapacitated adult’s best interests.
Now, to deem consent when consent has not been given or cannot 
be given is to resort to a fiction.19 There are, however, some important 
differences between this fiction and the fiction we have imputed in 
the Pro-Life Alliance case. The most important of these differences 
is that the putative fiction in the Pro-Life Alliance case is a device 
to ensure that what the law seeks to protect (functional embryos) 
is protected, the fiction of deemed consent, on the other hand, is a 
fiction about what the HTA 2004 ostensibly seeks to protect, viz., the 
autonomy of persons.20 Unless this is the case, there is no need for 
appropriate consent (per s.1 and s.5) to be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for lawfulness under the Act.
This, however, raises problems. If autonomy is the essential value 
to be protected, then to deem it to be served when it cannot be served 
or has not been served is nothing short of deliberate obfuscation. If 
it is permissible to deem the purpose of the law to be served when 
it cannot be or is not served, then this, by being self-contradictory, 
not only deprives the law of all meaning but involves both the logical 
and moral absurdity of regarding a value as protected by its very 
violation. As Lon Fuller has most persuasively maintained,21 essential 
requirements of observance of the Rule of Law include that there 
be non-contradictory rules and that there be congruence between 
official action and declared rule. In the fiction of deemed consent, we 
have violation of both these requirements because the contradiction 
permits congruence with the rule to be constituted by its very non-
congruence.
It should also be noted that, as a matter of general legal principle, 
this fiction is completely unnecessary. It would, at least in principle, 
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have been open to the legislator simply to have provided an exemption 
from the requirement for consent under the conditions under which 
the consent is to be deemed to be given (per s.6, and, by the same 
token, s.7). To do this would, clearly, require consent not to have 
been made a necessary and sufficient condition of lawful action.22 
Now, if consent were, in the wider legal scheme of things, to have 
such a status, then this would not be an available option. However, 
this is not the case in the UK. The idea that there are public interest 
exemptions from the requirement for consent in relation to the use 
and disclosure of sensitive personal data and other invasions of a 
person’s bodily and personal integrity is well-established in English 
case law and statutes.23 Of course, subsequent to the Human Rights 
Act 1998, all UK legislation must be interpreted to be in conformity 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) if it is 
possible to do so.24 However, this does not remove this option. While 
it is arguable that Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged by the use and 
storage of human tissue,25 and that there is a prima facie violation of 
Article 8(1) without the explicit consent of the source of the tissue,26 
Article 8(2) provides for an exemption from this requirement if a 
number of conditions laid down in Article 8(2) are satisfied.27
Whether or not the conditions laid down in Regulation 3(2)(a) of 
the Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent 
and Transplants) Regulations 2006 would satisfy the requirements of 
Article 8(2) ECHR is moot. However, if we suppose that they would, 
then is it not arguable that, in practice, deeming consent under the 
conditions set by the Regulations rather than overriding it (which 
appeal to Article 8(2) involves) makes little difference? We think not. 
An important legal principle is at stake here, which has important 
practical implications. The principle at stake is the distinction 
between non-engagement of a right and the overriding of a right. If 
consent is deemed to be given, where consent would be sufficient to 
legitimate an action, then no further justification is required for the 
action. In the present case, to characterise the issue as a matter of 
consent having been given is, by implication, to deny the engagement 
of Article 8(1) ECHR, which implies that no justification is required 
in terms of Article 8(2). On the other hand, to characterise it as a 
matter of exemption is to recognise that Article 8(1) is engaged and 
that a justification in terms of Article 8(2) is required. Of course, 
if the conditions under which consent is to be deemed to be given 
would satisfy the conditions imposed by Article 8(2), then the result 
will, consequentially, be the same. The practical problem, however, 
is that the need for such a congruence is denied by the deeming of 
consent, which has the effect that, while the issue of compatibility 
with the ECHR has not been removed, the ability of the UK courts 
to consider the matter is made more complicated. A conundrum is 
312
created. For, surely, before the courts can consider whether Article 
8(2) conditions are satisfied, they must determine that Article 8(1) 
is engaged. But since the Act implicitly denies that Article 8(1) is 
engaged, if the courts find that it is engaged they must consider the 
Act to be incompatible (in relation to which they can only make a 
declaration of incompatibility with Article 8(1)), but cannot proceed 
to consider the substantive issue of compatibility with Article 8(2). 
No doubt the courts would find a way around this; but it is difficult 
to see how a solution could be anything but ad hoc. In any event, 
the effect of deeming consent obscures the fact that the parameters 
to consider are those of Article 8(2) ECHR. This, in a society and 
legal system that purports to respect human rights, is not a matter of 
merely theoretical import.28
As we have already intimated, certain formal and procedural 
conditions (such as congruence between declared rule and official 
action) are universal requirements of the rule of law. To argue that 
adherence to human rights values is such is much more contentious. 
Nevertheless, such substantive values can be so deeply embedded in 
a legal system that they can come to be regarded as requirements 
of the rule of law (hence essential legal values). While the UK is 
to a degree ambivalent about giving the values of the ECHR this 
status, there can be no doubt that the idea that human rights are 
fundamental rights/freedoms encapsulates this idea. It is implicit that 
for all civilised countries, human rights are part of the ordre public, 
and ordre public in this context is to be understood as that set of 
fundamental principles that underpin the legal system in a state.29
With reference to the events that led to the HTA, the deemed 
consent provisions of the Act appear to be an attempt to satisfy 
two irreconcilable bodies of opinion. On the one hand, there is an 
increasingly vociferous lobby for the idea that consent is necessary 
and sufficient for all actions impinging on the private sphere of a 
person’s body or personality to be ethical.30 On the other hand, there 
is a body of opinion that denies this, and considers that there are 
circumstances in which consent is not necessary (and might also 
not be sufficient).31 Rhetorically, the legislature has sided with the 
former group, Yet, by permitting various actions without consent, 
the legislature has, in practical effect, sided with the latter group. 
In so doing, it has acted as though it believes that it will satisfy the 
former simply by stating that consent is necessary and sufficient for 
lawfulness. This is naïve. A rose by any other name smells just as 
sweet and rotten cabbages by any other name smell just as foul. And, 
to add another metaphor, actions speak louder than words. This will 
fool no-one and runs the risk of undermining respect for the law.
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Blackstone and Bentham Again
Our analysis has focussed on two rather special cases. It is, 
therefore, not easy to draw confident generalisations. However, we 
suggest that the following premises may serve as the basis for a 
deeper analysis.
(1) What is a legal fact as against a legal fiction is to be determined 
by definitions that are driven by the purposes to be served by the 
law.
(2) Some purposes to be served by the law are essential to the rule 
of law in any legal system. While only natural lawyers would 
declare various substantive values to be conceptually connected 
to the rule of law, even legal positivists will generally accept 
that certain formal procedural requirements (hence values) are 
necessary for legal validity (if only because they are necessary 
for a system of rules to be a coherent system of rules at all). 
However, in some legal systems, specific substantive values will 
come to be so enshrined in the system that, in these societies at 
least, conformity with these values will be seen to be necessary 
for conformity with the rule of law. Such values will normally be 
enshrined in written constitutions, but their general characteristic 
is that they will be viewed as fundamental principles of law, with 
which all other laws and public, including state, actions must 
conform. This is characteristically the case with the ECHR in 
Europe and those values (which include those of the ECHR) that 
the European Court of Justice has recognised as fundamental 
principles of EC law.
(3) Other purposes and values of the law are not so fundamental. 
They are contingent (and wholly optional) for legal systems to 
pursue.
We suggest that fictions that serve to promote conformity with 
legal purposes are not to be regarded as legal fictions, provided that the 
fictions do not distort or fictionalise essential legal values (procedural 
or substantive). Those that do are not only fictions, but wholly 
reprehensible and not to be countenanced. The fiction of deemed 
consent in the HTA falls into this category (involving violations of 
the rule of law at both of the levels we have identified) and merits 
Bentham’s vituperative remarks. The fiction involved32 in the Pro-Life 
Alliance case, by our reasoning, does not fall into this category and 
Blackstone’s attitude towards them seems more appropriate.
We will now try to apply and expand this analysis by looking at 
a number of cases in patent law.
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PART TWO
Determination of Genetic Sequences in Nature as Inventions
It is a general principle of patent law that patents cannot be 
awarded for mere discoveries.33 This is encapsulated in Article 5(1) 
of the Directive 98/44/EC on Biotechnological Inventions, according 
to which,
The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, 
and the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence 
or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.
However, according to Article 5(2) of the same Directive,
An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by 
means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence 
of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure 
of that element is identical to that of a natural element.
What appears to be the crucial difference as to whether a gene 
sequence is patentable or not, is the process of isolation.34 Once 
the identification, purification and classification has resulted in the 
isolation of the gene sequence by a technical process, the subject 
matter is an invention and not a discovery. Where biological material 
is concerned this will almost certainly be the case in any given 
situation.35
In the present context, this raises the question, ‘Is it a legal 
fiction to consider gene sequences that are determined by state of 
the art methods as inventions when the sequences themselves are not 
novel but are identical to those occurring in nature, and have indeed 
simply been isolated from nature?’
The terms ‘discover’ and ‘invent’ are closely related. Indeed, 
according to Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of English Usage,36 the 
original meaning in English of ‘invent’ is ‘to come upon, find, or 
discover’. However, the terms were later distinguished from each 
other. According to Hugo Blair,37 ‘[d]iscover differs from invent. 
We discover what before existed, though to us unknown: we invent 
what did not before exist’. In such terms, which represent central 
modern usage38 ‘discover’ means to ‘find something existing that 
was not known before’. ‘Invent’ means ‘to create’ or ‘to originate’. 
The determination of a gene sequence existing in nature would be 
a discovery and could not possibly be an invention. Nevertheless 
as Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary further explains, there are uses of 
’discover‘ that do not presuppose prior existence of what is discovered. 
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So, more generally, ‘to discover’ is ‘[t]o find out, to obtain the first 
knowledge of, to come to the knowledge of something sought or 
before unknown’. But, even on this basis, it remains a fiction to 
regard the determination of a gene sequence occurring in nature as 
an invention rather than a discovery.
However, bearing in mind the terms of our preceding analysis, 
this does not make this construction a legal fiction as against a fiction 
for the purposes of the law. If the purpose of patent law is to grant 
a certain kind of protection to particular entities and it is necessary 
to construe terms so as to ensure that protection, then as long as the 
law itself does not prohibit such a construction, the fiction is not 
a legal fiction. So, the matter must be referred to the purposes of 
patent law.
Historically, the purpose of granting a patent was to reward 
inventors, understood as creators, for their inventiveness (creativity). 
This was a natural right and accords with the views on property rights 
of philosophers such as Locke.39 Later, however, the rationale shifted. 
At first the shift was subtle. The purpose became, primarily, to prevent 
the injustice of permitting those other than the inventor from profiting 
from the labour of the inventor without having incurred similar costs. 
Bentham argued that because an invention involved a great deal of 
time, money and effort and also included a large element of risk, the 
exclusive use of the invention must be reserved for a period of time 
for the inventor.40 More recently, however, the rationale appears to be 
based on economic theories such as those put forward by Nelson and 
Mazzoleni.41 These authors seek to justify the patent system as a way 
of creating incentives for persons to invest money in the production 
of useful products by protecting their investment from exploitation 
by others. 
We should note that these rationales have implications for the 
conditions under which patents are to be granted. In particular, it 
is clear that if the purpose of a patent regime is merely to create 
incentives for investment then there is no need for inventiveness to 
be a condition of patent protection. Thus, if the purpose of patent 
law is taken to be this, there should be no need to fictionalise certain 
discoveries as inventions because discoveries should be patentable. 
But conversely, if the law insists on inventiveness as a condition for 
protection, then the rationale cannot simply be the need to create 
incentives for investment.
Given that the law (at least Directive 98/44/EC) clearly intends 
what would normally be thought of as discoveries to be patentable, 
the logical implication is that the purpose relative to which we 
must determine whether or not a fiction is involved here, is that of 
investment protection.42 Relative to this, the fiction is not a legal 
fiction, but a fiction for the purposes of the law. However, this does 
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not render it altogether harmless in this case. For, the fact that this 
implies that inventiveness need not be a condition of patent protection 
renders the law confusing and opaque. This is not necessary. It can 
and should be remedied by either creating a new intellectual property 
right (a ‘discovery right’), or by dropping inventiveness as a condition 
of patentability.43 
The patentability of animal varieties
According to the first subparagraph of Article 53(b) EPC, 
European patents shall not be granted for. 
Plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals
In the Oncomouse case,44 which concerned a patent application 
for a genetically engineered mouse to be used as a model for cancer 
research, this provision was used by the Examining Division of 
the European Patent Office (EPO) to reject the application, on the 
grounds that the exclusion of ‘animal varieties’ is an exclusion of 
animals as such.45 One of the reasons given was that the terms used 
in the three official languages of the EPC (German, English and 
French), viz. ‘tierart’, ‘animal variety’ and ‘race animale’ are not 
equivalent in anything like their scientific meanings. The Examining 
Division did not expand, but it is possible to construct its reasoning 
in the following way. In its scientific meaning, ‘tierart’ is equivalent 
to ‘species’ in English, ‘animal variety’ has no formally recognised 
scientific meaning following the International Code of Zoological 
Nomenclature agreed at the XVth International Congress of Zoology 
in London held in July 1958 and informally refers to a sub-sub-
species category, whereas ‘race animale’ is equivalent to ‘breed’. 
However, ‘tierart’, ‘animal variety’ and ‘race animale’ also carry 
everyday usage meanings, in which they simply refer to types of 
animal in general regardless of level of classification. Because Article 
177(1) of the EPC states that the three official languages are to be 
given equal force, the everyday meaning must be attributed.
On appeal, however, the Board of Appeal requested the 
Examining Division to reconsider its ruling.46 When it did so, the 
Examining Division decided that the exclusion of ‘animal varieties’ 
etc. only amounted to an exclusion of claims that are to a specific 
species of animal or a specific sub-species or sub-sub-species of 
animal. However, if the patent is intended to cover a higher level 
of classification (e.g., a genus) then the invention is not excluded.47 
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In effect, if the oncomouse is described as a particular species of 
mouse then the patent may not be granted. On the other hand, if it 
is described as a member of the rodent genus then the patent is not 
excluded by Article 53(b).
In evaluating this reasoning, it must be borne in mind just 
how artificial this is. For it is clear that every rodent will also be a 
member of a particular species, a member of a particular breed, etc. 
Consequently to regard the claim as not being a patent on a species 
or lower classification by virtue of being a patent worded in terms 
of being on a member of a genus, is at least a fiction (and is surely 
a contradiction, as it is not the term that is being patented but the 
animal). What undoubtedly drives this is the general policy operated 
by patent law that exceptions to patentability are to be construed as 
narrowly as possible, so that if there is any interpretation possible 
that evades the exception then that interpretation must be given.48 
There must, however, be limits to this, otherwise all exceptions to 
patent law are empty. So, bearing in mind that purposive construction 
must accord not just with general policy intentions but also with 
specific intentions of the drafters of the law, it should surely have 
been considered by the Examining Board that if the intention of the 
drafters was to exclude only invented species (and lower classification) 
then they would have referred to ‘species’ in English, ‘espèces’ in 
French and ‘tieraten’ in German. After all, these are equivalent in 
meaning, are scientifically recognised classifications, and patent law 
does generally assume that words are to be given their scientific 
meanings.49 
Cells as Microbiological Entities
According to the second sub-paragraph of Article 53(b) EPC, 
the first subparagraph ‘does not apply to microbiological processes 
or the products thereof’. Consequently, the bar on patenting animal 
(and plant) varieties (and set by the first sub-paragraph of Article 
52(b) EPC) does not apply if the animal variety is a microbiological 
process or the product thereof.50 This is obvious from the wording, 
though it is interesting to note that the Examining Division of the 
EPO in the Oncomouse case did not originally consider that onco-
mice, as an animal variety, would be patentable even if they were 
produced by a microbiological process.51 
Now, according to Rule 23(b)(6)
‘Microbiological process’ means any process involving or performed 
upon or resulting in microbiological material.52
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The patent offices have interpreted the exception to this 
subparagraph contained in the second sub-paragraph of Article 53(b) 
to permit cell-lines (whether of animal or human tissue) as well 
as types of fungi to be patented.53 This is odd because it requires 
cell-lines and fungi to be construed as animal or plant varieties 
or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals. Otherwise the first sub-paragraph of Article 53(b) presents 
no bar to their patentability. Fungi may be so interpreted readily, 
though only if animal/plant varieties carry everyday usage rather than 
scientific meanings. But it is difficult to see the basis for interpreting 
cell-lines as animal/plant varieties without extending this reference to 
cover all living biological material. A fiction appears to be involved 
here which is certainly not a fiction for the purposes of the law (in 
the case of cell-lines) as it does not appear to be necessary to serve 
any legal purpose, or (in the case of fungi) is only necessary when a 
reading of the first sub-paragraph is given that the EPO has rejected 
(as we have already seen from the Oncomouse case).
But let us pass over this and suppose that there are no 
complications of this sort to disentangle. If so, then the question arises 
as to whether or not fungi/cell-lines are microbiological processes or 
the products of microbiological processes. On Rule 23(b)(6) fungi 
are surely not microbiological processes. However, they might, if 
genetically modified by insertion of genes into individual cells, be 
products of microbiological processes, while cell-lines clearly are 
products of microbiological material (as they are grown from individual 
cells) which are microbiological material (i.e. biological material of 
a microscopic size). No fiction, then, is involved in reading cell-lines 
or fungi produced by specific means as microbiological processes for 
the purposes the second sub-paragraph of Article 53(b).
We have looked at these examples of purposive construction in 
patent law in order to illustrate the usefulness of the distinction we 
have made between legal fictions proper and fictions for the purposes 
of the law. This process also shows clearly how much purposive 
construction is relative to the purposes of the law. And this serves 
to explain why purposive construction is likely to be a controversial 
matter; for determining the purposes of (the) law is not always as 
clear cut as it might be. In the Pro-Life Alliance case, the purpose 
is clear (and given in the preparation and passing of the HFE Act). 
In the case of deemed consent, the purpose may be referred to the 
interpretive role of the HRA. In the patent law cases, however, the 
purposes of the law are not given in the same way. The purposes 
of patent law appear to have changed over time and this has been 
a process driven by industrial practice and the patent system rather 
than by legislation. Patent law, as with all areas of law, cannot remain 
static. It has had to respond to changes in technology, especially to the 
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rapid advances in biotechnology seen in the last 20 years. Alongside 
these advances, there have been wholesale changes in attitude as to 
the justification of the patent system, where economic considerations 
are often considered paramount. However, the patent system has often 
employed legal semantics to interpret existing law to reach a desired 
outcome54 that reflects these changes rather than acceptance that the 
law needs to be amended. What has transpired has not merely been 
a lack of clarity and a degree of legal uncertainty, but has involved 
distortion of the law to an extent that is not compatible with the rule 
of law. 
Concluding Remarks
An account of legal fictions that has achieved classic status is 
provided by Lon Fuller55. However, our argument has implications for 
this account, and some remarks about this are called for. According 
to Fuller, a legal fiction has three elements: falsity, utility and 
dangerousness. Legal fictions are ‘false statement[s] recognised as 
having utility’56 Furthermore, Fuller believed that legal fictions are 
inherently dangerous in that they can be carried to extremes if put 
to uses not intended by their authors or if taken too seriously as 
statements of fact rather than as useful metaphors.57
It is clear that issues arise when we delve into the test for truth 
or falsity, or into the criteria for utility or dangerousness. While this 
is not the time to develop a comprehensive analysis of these tests and 
criteria, it must be noted that our proposed distinction cuts across 
the idea that ‘the most useful test for falsity [in connection with 
the idea of a legal fiction] is to ask whether the statement asserts 
or implies a fact that would be regarded as false by a[n] ordinary 
layperson, standing outside the legal system and looking in’,58 which 
some commentators advocate. Secondly, it cuts across the notion 
that the tests for utility and truth are entirely independent (at least 
where legal definitions are, as we have argued, to be given purposive 
constructions driven by a commitment to legal/moral values). Thirdly, 
our account implies that what it classifies as legal fictions properly 
speaking (i.e., fictions about the law), are not merely dangerous, but 
necessarily inimical, whereas fictions for the purposes of the law are 
inimical only when the purposes of the law itself are inimical.
NOTES
*We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for thought provoking comments 
which have helped us to sharpen some of our analysis.
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